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Letter dated 3 July 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1407 (2002), I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the team of experts (see annex).

The Committee would appreciate it if this letter, together with its annex, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Stefan **Tafrov**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

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Annex

Report of the team of experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1407 (2002), paragraph 1, concerning Somalia

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Organisations and abbreviations

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism established by IGAD
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organisation
IPIS	International Peace Information System
IRG	International Reference Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa
NRC	National Reconciliation Conference sponsored by IGAD
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
Puntland	Self-proclaimed region in part of Somalia
Republic of Somaliland	Self-proclaimed independent state in part of Somalia
RRA	Rahenwayn Resistance Army Militia, active in Bay and Bakool regions
SALIGAD	Small Arms and Light Weapons: Assessing Issues and Developing Capacity for Peace in the Horn of Africa
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council
State of South and Southwest Somalia	Self-proclaimed government of a region of Somalia established mainly with RRA support
TNG	Transitional National Government in Somalia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
WCO	World Customs Organisation

Executive summary

1. No effective central government has been in place in Somalia since 1991. A number of groupings in the country have significant military capacity that they sustain through acquisitions of arms and military equipment from outside the country.

2. Within the region there is currently an attempt to find a political solution leading to the creation of an effective government and administration in Somalia. The failure to enforce the arms embargo threatens to undermine that attempt.

3. The internal situation in Somalia contributes to insecurity and instability in neighbouring countries.

4. It is alleged that some governments supply arms and military equipment to armed groupings inside Somalia in order to further political and strategic objectives.

5. It is alleged that armed groupings in Somalia take advantage of illicit trafficking networks to meet their requirements.

6. It is alleged that international networks motivated by political or ideological factors supply arms to groupings in Somalia.

7. Arms acquisitions are financed in different ways including through revenues from local business activities, remittances from overseas Somali populations, donations from other states and international agencies, from the proceeds of organised crime and through contact with terrorist networks.

8. There is a need to define the scope of the embargo more clearly.

9. In the short term the effectiveness of the embargo can be enhanced through direct intervention with states neighbouring Somalia.

10. A regional monitoring system needs to be established in the region sustained by engagement with local initiatives in cooperation with the United Nations.

11. The Team of Experts recommends the establishment of a Panel of Experts consisting of at least three persons based in Nairobi, Kenya and provided with administrative support in Nairobi and New York.

I. Introduction

A. General

12. In preparation for a Panel of Experts, the Secretary-General on 23 May 2002, appointed a Team of Experts (S/2002/575) pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1407 (2002) concerning Somalia. The Team of Experts was tasked to provide the Committee with an action plan detailing the resources and expertise that the Panel of Experts would require to be able to generate independent information on violations and for improving the enforcement of the weapon and military equipment embargo established by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 of 1992 (hereinafter referred to as "the arms embargo").

13. Paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) states that:

> The Security Council..... decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise.

14. The tasks the Panel of Experts would be expected to carry out as enumerated in paragraph 1 of resolution 1407 (2002) include:
    - investigating the violations of the arms embargo covering access to Somalia by land, air and sea;
    - detailing information in relevant areas of expertise related to violations and enforcement of the arms embargo in its various aspects;
    - carrying out field-based research, where possible, in Somalia, States neighbouring Somalia and other States, as appropriate;
    - assessing the capacity of States in the region to implement fuily the arms embargo, including through a review of national customs and border control regimes,
    - providing recommendations on possible practical steps for further strengthening the enforcement of the arms embargo.

15. The Team of Experts took note of the Statement of the President of the Security Council of 28 March (S/PRST/2002/8), the press release by Security Council Committee on Somalia of 29 May 2002 (SC/7417) and the Report of the Secretary General of 21 February 2002 (S/2002/189).

16. The Team of Experts consisted of Mr. Ian Anthony, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute expert on arms) and Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (expert with Interpol investigative experience) (see Annex 1).

17. The Team had its first organisational meeting at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm (Sweden) from 1 – 8 June 2002 and subsequently had informal consultations in New York with the Security Council Committee concerning Somalia on 10 June 2002. It was agreed that the Team's report would be submitted on 28 June 2002.

18. The Team received a great deal of logistical and moral support from the Security Council Committee concerning Somalia, the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Resident Coordinators and UNDP officials in all the countries it visited. Governments helped with information and advice, and many individuals provided useful information. The Team also received useful cooperation and assistance from Interpol and SIPRI and made proper use of their expertise.

B. Methodology

19. The Team interviewed government authorities, and where relevant, diplomatic missions, civil society organisations, aid agencies, private sector firms and journalists. The Team also contacted a number of key knowledgeable individuals including some of the Somalian faction leaders (Annex 2). Within the limited time frame the Team travelled to the neighbouring countries of Somalia, particularly Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya in order to gain first hand knowledge of the ground situation.

II. Overview of the situation in and around Somalia

20. Since 1988 Somalia has experienced a devastating civil war, which has driven millions of people abroad and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands more. This has led to the socio-economic deterioration and fragmentation of the state. No effective central government has been in place since 1991. A detailed picture of the evolution of the extremely complicated political and military situation inside Somalia is outside the scope of this report. Observations here are limited to those considered relevant to the issue of arms embargo violations and prospects for enhanced effectiveness in enforcement.

21. A number of groupings that are active in Somalia maintain a significant military capacity. While there is no precise estimate, authoritative observers believe that around 12–14 such groupings can be identified (Annex 3 and 5). The

nature of these main armed groupings is heterogeneous and the fighters they contain may owe loyalty at any given time to one of six types of authority:

a) An individual "warlord".
b) A recognised clan leadership (which might be one individual or a council).
c) A district governor.
d) The leadership of a region that extends over more than one district.
e) A religious (Islamic) movement.
f) A group that links two or more of these types of authority (such as the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC)).

22. The military capability of each group is impossible to estimate with precision. Moreover, individual warlords or the leaders of sub-clan armed groupings may shift their allegiances from one authority to another depending on prevailing conditions. However, the largest grouping is believed to consist of roughly 7000 fighters and the smallest roughly 100 fighters. In addition there are said to be a large number of small but unaffiliated armed gangs whose services can be bought on a commercial basis by groupings temporarily seeking to enhance their capabilities. Collectively these unaffiliated gangs are believed to contain more fighters than the more stable groupings and purchasing their services can therefore shift the military balance in a particular location quickly. Annex 3 summarises information that was available to the Team, though it must be emphasised that table entries are no more than an estimate in each case.

23. All of the forces appear to be in essence light infantry that in certain cases have access to small quantities of heavy weapons. Where units are mechanized it is often through the use of civilian off-road vehicles. The needs of these groupings are limited by their objectives, which are often very local, and because they are unable to absorb large quantities of arms and equipment. The primary need could be for ammunition, fuel and spare parts for civilian vehicles being used for military purposes.

24. The nature of military engagements taking place in 2002 has changed in comparison with the early 1990s. Most engagements are localised and involve 30 to 50 combatants on either side. Very occasionally a bigger engagement may take place with up to 500 combatants on either side. Engagements rarely last more than one day, partly because of a shortage of ammunition but also because of the rapid intervention of clan leaders to end the fighting.

25. The internal situation in Somalia has had spill-over effects in all of the neighbouring countries. These countries all regard the internal security situation in Somalia as a current threat to their national security. Given legitimate security concerns, none of the neigbouring countries feel that they can remain indifferent to these developments.

26. There is an effort to develop a common strategy to improve the security situation in Somalia within a regional political framework. The main emphasis of these processes is to create a political framework in which Somalia can be governed more effectively. The regional processes recognise that the failure to enforce the arms embargo on Somalia is a factor that complicates and perhaps undermines their activities. Somali groupings seek to enhance their relative military capability during the period in which a political framework is being created in the belief that military power will guarantee both a seat at the table and more influence over the outcome. A failure to enforce the embargo is probably delaying the creation of a political framework among Somali groupings.

III. Main allegations of violations of the arms embargo

A. Summary of allegations

27. There is a common view that the embargo has not been enforced effectively since it was established in 1992. Violations have taken place up to the present day. Observers inside and outside the region share this view. Annex 4 lists the main identified allegations of violations since 1992.

28. The volume of arms flows has not been constant. In 1991 the collapse of the previous government released the stocks of the former armed forces into the internal market. Between 1992–94 there were significant arms acquisitions from Central Europe. After 1994 it is believed that the volume of arms flowing in was low as the amount of arms already in the country was very high. The volume is said to have increased in the period 1997–2000 as a side effect of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. From late 2001 there is said to have been another rise in the level of arms coming into Somalia as a part of the competition between Somali groupings in advance of the anticipated conference of concerned parties in Nairobi under the auspices of the IGAD.

29. In general the level of trafficking is low in comparison with the volumes involved in some other conflict locations. Typical reports speak of shipments consisting of one or several trucks, one air cargo load or on dhows that move goods around the coasts of East Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Over the period 1992–2002 there have been a few reports of larger shipments delivered by dedicated military transport vehicles.

30. The violations can be sorted into three generic types.

First, it is alleged that some governments supply arms and military equipment to armed groupings inside Somalia in order to further political and strategic objectives.

Second, it is alleged that armed groupings in Somalia take advantage of illicit arms trafficking networks to meet their needs. These networks supply arms for commercial rather than political objectives. One network connects the Somali community living and working outside Somalia to local arms markets. Reports mention Somali communities in Arab countries (notably Yemen) in particular. Individuals may bring small numbers of weapons—perhaps just one weapon or up to 5 or 6—along with them when returning to Somalia, often on board dhows that move goods and people through the local seaways to ports all along the coast of Somalia. Another means of moving small quantities of arms is across the land border by donkey. These weapons will be sold in local markets to raise cash. This commercial trafficking is not limited to arms. The same method is used to traffic other goods, such as endangered wildlife species, drugs and ivory.

Third, there are allegations that some of the armed formations that are active in Somalia are able to receive arms and military equipment through international networks that are motivated by ideological or political (rather than commercial) objectives.

31. Arms acquisitions are financed in the following ways:

- Through revenues generated by business activities in Somalia.
- Through donations from foreign governments.
- Through remittances from Somali nationals overseas.
- From the proceeds of organised crime, such as trafficking in drugs, endangered species and people.
- Through contact with terrorist networks.

32. In Mogadishu some leading businessmen have outflanked militia leaders from their own clans and have started buying the backing of individual militia fighters. This has allowed them to finance their own security forces and to buy weapons directly.

33. Since there is no government controlled financial sector in Somalia, certain remittance companies operating both inside and outside Somalia have stepped in to fill the gap. The remittances going through them can be divided into three broad categories:

i. Remittance to support the Somali families.
ii. Remittance for investment or starting a business in Somalia.
iii. Remittance for conducting trade in international markets.

34. Somalia's characteristics as a failed state make it attractive for hard-to-trace financial transactions and transhipment of goods and personnel. Once a payment for arms consignment has been routed through a remittance company, it becomes extremely difficult to trace. At least one remittance company named Al Barakat has come to Interpol notice on suspicion of financing terrorism.

35. Factions inside Somalia have received donations from friendly countries with ties to the region. The use to which these funds are put is not monitored. There are reports that the TNG received US$2.5 million in February 2002 from Libya for its security forces.

36. Though Somalia is not a particularly attractive site for a fixed base of operations for al-Qaeda, or for that matter for any other transnational terrorist network, it remains an excellent location for short-term transhipment and transit operations by all sorts of criminal and terrorist groups. Its innumerable dirt landing strips allow easy access by small aircraft and natural beach ports and long coast line allow easy and undetected smuggling of people and material.

37. Somalia appears prominently on the radar screen for drug trafficking and smuggling of human and wild life. Remittance companies operating in and outside Somalia provide criminals with a convenient tool for moving money internationally and for making payment for weapons purchases.

B. The approach to enhanced effectiveness in enforcement

38. The armed formations within Somalia regard enhancing their military capabilities as a main priority. Any design for a monitoring and enforcement strategy should assume that armed formations would not comply voluntarily.

39. Nevertheless there is an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the arms embargo. All neighbouring states have said that the even-handed enforcement of the arms embargo is in their interests. Equally, they see risks to themselves if the embargo is enforced in ways that favour particular groupings in Somalia.

40. In the light of the limited technical capacities available and the prevailing political atmosphere effective enforcement cannot rest on actions by states bordering Somalia alone.

41. The quickest way to enhance the effectiveness of the enforcement of the embargo is through direct diplomatic engagement by the Security Council Committee concerning Somalia with the states that border Somalia.

42. After their experience of the past 10 years regional actors believe that the international community has the capacity but lacks the will to enforce the embargo effectively.

43. The first objective should be to restore the credibility of the Security Council Committee concerning Somalia by making clear that a serious monitoring and enforcement effort is now being put in place.

44. Given the need to build confidence among all actors, the second objective should be to develop sustained cooperation between states outside the region, the immediate neighbours of Somalia, the United Nations and other relevant international organisations as well as non-governmental actors.

45. The enforcement effort should be linked to the development of the regional peace process to make it sustainable.

IV. Resources required to generate independent information on violations and to improve the enforcement of the arms embargo

46. In order to generate independent information the Panel of Experts will need the following resources.

47. The Panel of Experts itself will need sufficient human resources, including a Chairman and at least two additional members. The Panel will require access to various kinds of technical expertise. The following expertise will be required:

- Expertise on armaments.
- Expertise on civil aviation.
- Expertise on maritime transport.
- Expertise on regional affairs, including specialized knowledge of Somalia.

48. Time is a resource for the Panel of Experts and it is recommended that the duration of the activity should initially be six months.

49. The Panel of Experts will require administrative support in New York and in the East African region. The most efficient way to organise these resources would be for the Panel of Experts to be based in East Africa for the main duration of its activities.

50. The recommended size does not allow for all of the requisite expertise to be represented within the Panel of Experts. Therefore financial resources need to be sufficient to allow for specific expertise to be purchased from consultants. The resources need to be sufficient to permit the extensive travel required both within the region and to visit other relevant parties.

51. The information resources available to the Panel of Experts should include materials from open sources. There should be sufficient financial resources to pay subscriptions to public databases and news services.

52. Apart from open source material, the Panel of Experts will depend on cooperation with a number of different bodies from which the Security Council should formally request assistance.

A. Cooperation with states

53. States that export arms to states bordering on Somalia should be contacted to evaluate exports made during the period after the embargo was established with a view to establishing the risk that these items were diverted to Somalia.

54. States from whose territory it is alleged that arms and military equipment have been exported to Somalia should be contacted to gain any information relevant to the purposes of the Panel of Experts.

55. States that are known to monitor developments in and around the territory of Somalia (including its airspace, maritime boundaries and land borders) using their national technical means should be contacted and requested to provide information relevant to the purposes of the Panel of Experts.

B. Cooperation with regional processes

56. During meetings with the Team of Experts the representatives of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) committed themselves to assist the activities of any Panel of Experts that is created.

57. The Team believes that the IGAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Unit would be a particularly important cooperation partner. The Panel of Experts' activities should be designed in a way that helps build a regional mechanism that could support IGAD activities beyond the life of the Panel. For example, IGAD could be requested to second an officer to the Panel as a regional specialist. This officer would then take back to IGAD the expertise and information acquired during the Panel.

C. Cooperation with international organisations and inter-governmental arrangements from outside the region

58. A precondition for arms embargo enforcement is an effective national export control system. A number of arms exporting states have recognised that national export controls can be made more effective through practical cooperation and sharing of information. Several initiatives and processes could be relevant to the improved enforcement of the weapon and military equipment embargo.

59. The states participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA) as well as the WA secretariat should be contacted to establish whether or not an evaluation of the armament dynamic in the region of East Africa or in Somalia specifically has been made and if so whether this assessment could be made available to the United Nations. The states should be asked whether they can identify cases of export licence denials to Somalia or cases of denial of arms supply to other countries on the basis that there is a risk of diversion to Somalia.

60. The European Union Member States should be contacted to establish whether the military end-use controls introduced in Council Regulation (EC) no. 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 has led to any information that might shed light on arms embargo violations. The military end-use control requires an exporter to apply for an export licence for the export of any item (whether or not it is contained on an export control list) to Somalia if the item is known to be for military use.

61. Interpol should be contacted to determine whether expertise on arms trafficking in Eastern Africa, organised crime in Eastern Africa, economic and financial crime in Eastern Africa and crime analysis could be available to the Panel of Experts on a continuous basis.

D. Cooperation with non-governmental bodies

62. Non-governmental organisations and research centres with specialised knowledge of the arms trade and developments in East Africa should be contacted to establish whether they would be prepared to make information and expertise available to the Panel of Experts.

V. Improving the enforcement of the weapon and military equipment embargo

A. Define the scope of the embargo

63. Written in 1992, before the extensive discussion of arms embargo reform that has subsequently taken place, Resolution 733 leaves room for national interpretation of its scope.

64. The Security Council could usefully clarify the scope of the embargo, preferably to make clear that the provision of financing and services of any kind that support military activities in Somalia is a violation of the embargo.

65. In paragraph 5 of the resolution the Security Council decides that 'all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all *deliveries of weapons and military equipment* to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise'.

66. In paragraph 6 of the resolution the Security Council 'Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Somalia'.

67. Accordingly, it is unclear whether activities such as the provision of financing to train and equip armed groupings within Somalia and the provision of services (such as training, repair and maintenance of existing equipment) are within the scope of the embargo.

68. In addition, the scope of the term 'military equipment' could usefully be clarified either through the development of a reference list or through the adoption of a military end-use principle. In the case of Somalia the military end-use approach may be preferred because of the widespread use of civilian vehicles in military operations.

B. Enhance end-user verification

69. End-user verification is one of the most important instruments to prevent exported arms and military equipment from reaching unauthorised persons and organisations.

70. Recent reports under the auspices of the United Nations and the United States Department of State suggest that illicit arms transactions often originate in legitimate channels. The main activities identified are the fraudulent use of export documentation to acquire items through legitimate channels and the illegal diversion or re-export of items supplied using genuine documentation.

71. The Panel of Experts should have the authority and resources to take up contact with identified arms suppliers to states from whose territories violations of the arms embargo are alleged to have taken place with a view to verifying the subsequent use of arms exported to those states. In practice this would require (a) financial resources sufficient to carry out repeated country visits and (b) a document from the Security Council requesting or—preferably—requiring cooperation from national authorities.

C. Establish a Panel of Experts in the region

72. The creation of a Panel of Experts in East Africa, where Nairobi would be the most appropriate location, would maximise the chances of generating independent information.

73. First, a regional base would permit interaction with other resources that may have access to primary information. For example, UNDP Somalia has established a small arms project in Nairobi while the IGAD has established CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism). Moreover, Somali leaders and other individuals with important information regularly travel outside Somalia. The Panel of Experts may be able to meet with these individuals frequently and at short notice if it is based in the region.

74. Second, a regional base would facilitate visits to Somalia, which is an essential element in the overall investigation and monitoring exercise.

75. Giving the task of embargo investigation and monitoring to an existing UN body in the region could prejudice the prospects of that body being able to carry out its existing tasks. Therefore, it is recommended that a new entity be established, i.e., a Panel of Experts. While this new entity should be clearly separate from existing activities it should make use of the logistical and other UN resources already present in Nairobi to facilitate its operations.

76. To facilitate regular reporting and interaction with the Security Council Committee concerning Somalia, it is necessary for the Panel of Experts to include certain resources based in New York.

77. First, given the indefinite duration of the embargo, a central archive of documents and information generated both by the activities of the mechanism in East Africa and through other means is essential.

78. Second, a single person in New York should have responsibility for both the maintaining of the archive and the combination of information from different sources into consolidated reports available as UN documents.

79. Third, while enhancing the effectiveness of the implementation of the arms embargo on Somalia is sufficient justification to provide such resources, a central archive and consolidated reporting could provide materials that assist the wider UN sanctions enforcement effort and the activities of other Security Council Committees.

D. Promote transparency and accountability over financial institutions in Somalia

80. Somalia does not have a legal framework, technical expertise, security or operational central bank to regulate the working of any bank or financial institution. There is an urgent need to initiate a process to deal with these fundamental institutional and legal deficiencies. Until such time as an internationally regulated banking system is established in Somalia, the remittance companies will have to be encouraged to bridge the gap between their current methods of operations and what is required by the applicable international financial rules and regulations. Monitoring remittance companies and assistance to establish accountability in financial institutions should be a priority for the international community.

81. Donor countries and agencies should be encouraged to ensure transparency and accountability for the money given to Somalian leaders and agencies so that the risk that aid will be diverted for arms acquisition can be minimised.

VI. Recommended methodology of the Panel of Experts

82. Investigating cases of violations of arms embargo will require the Panel to use the following techniques:

83. **Questionnaires**: The Panel will need to seek specific information from the relevant countries, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, regarding certain arms shipments and the movement of suspicious aircraft used for illegal transportation of arms and ammunition. The Panel will also require details of exports from arms manufacturing countries to the region and the end-use of the same dating back to 1992. The Panel will also have to write to the countries geographically neighbouring to Somalia and other countries in the region (Djibouti, Ethiopia,

Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen) which might have the ability to monitor air, land and sea traffic in the area to identify the origin of the carriers of illicit arms and ammunition.

84. **Interviews:** In certain identified countries the Panel members will need to interview government authorities, diplomatic missions, inter-governmental organisations, law enforcement agencies, civil aviation authorities and companies, civil society and non-governmental organisations, aid agencies, private sector firms, financial institutions, and journalists.

85. **Visits to countries:** It will be necessary for the Panel to travel to the countries involved, or alleged to be involved in the trafficking of weapons and military equipment to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo and to countries which can provide useful information about such violations, including information about the financing of acquisitions. It is felt that the Panel must visit Djibouti, Dubai, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

86. **Field Trips:** There has been a lot of mystique attached to several places, particularly the air strips and sea ports within Somalia. To the extent that the security conditions permit, the Panel should visit such places to have a first hand knowledge on the situation. During these field visits, the Panel should try to speak to various factions involved in the conflict. Prominent armed groupings are listed in Annex 3.

87. **Assistance from International and Regional Organisations:** The Panel should seek cooperation and assistance from international and regional organisations such as Interpol, ICAO, IMO, IGAD, OAU and WCO and make proper use of their expertise. The facilities and databases available with the Sub-Regional Bureau of Interpol and ICAO-Somalia (both located in Nairobi) should be particularly utilized in pursuing information related to violations of arms embargo. The services of the Criminal Analysis Sub-directorate of the Interpol General Secretariat (Lyon, France) may also be requested to analyse the criminal intelligence available on these violations. The Interpol General Secretariat has the infrastructure in place to obtain information from its member countries using the X-400 system and ROCCIS (Regional Counter Crime Sharing Information System).

88. **Follow the Paper Trail and complete the Chain of Events:** There have been a number of allegations that different countries supply weapons and military equipment or finance the shipments of arms and ammunition. In some cases the weapons originate outside the region and are carried to Somalia directly or indirectly by certain suspicious airline companies. The Panel will be required to trace the entire sequence of events starting from the origin of weapons to the end-destination using documentary evidence and direct eye witness accounts of the persons involved. To prove the case convincingly, the Panel will need to obtain as many of the following documents concerning the planes involved in illegal arms supply to Somalia as possible:

- Copies of contracts signed by the contracting parties
- Requests and permissions for overflight and landing
- Flight plans
- Cargo manifests
- Airway bills
- Documents showing owners or operating agency of the aircraft involved
- Pilots logbooks

- Payments made
- Insurance documents for the cargo and the planes involved

89. Analysing these documents, the Panel can then trace the entire flight route taken by the aircraft bringing weapons to Somalia. In addition, the Panel will need to locate some of the pilots and the other crew members on board such aircraft. In case of shipments by land or sea, the oral testimony of eye witnesses may have to be relied upon.

Annex 1

Letter dated 23 May 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to resolution 1407 (2002), adopted by the Security Council on 3 May 2002, concerning Somalia. In paragraph 1 of the resolution the Council requested me to establish, within one month from the date of adoption of the resolution, in preparation for a Panel of Experts, a team of experts consisting of two members, for a period of 30 days, to provide the Committee with an action plan detailing the resources and expertise that the Panel of Experts would require to be able to generate independent information on violations and for improving the enforcement of the weapon and military equipment embargo established by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992).

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consultation with the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, I have appointed the following experts:

Ian Anthony (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute expert on arms)

Harjit Singh Sandhu (expert with Interpol investigative experience).

(*Signed*) Kofi A. Annan

Annex 2. List of meetings and consultations

Belgium

International Peace Information Service (IPIS)

Djibouti

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

European Union

IGAD

UNDP

Others

President of self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland

Foreign Minister of self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland

Ethiopia

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Defence

Civil Aviation Authority

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

France

The Team visited Interpol Headquarters in Lyon. Discussions were held with Specialised Officers dealing with arms trafficking, Organised Crime and Africa Sub-Division.

One member of the team attended a Partnership for Peace conference on export controls in Paris where discussions were possible with representatives from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria and Moldova.

Germany

Bonn International Center for Conversion

Kenya

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Commissioner of Police

Civil Aviation Authority

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

France

Italy

UNDP Kenya

UNDP Somalia

UNPOS

Others

ACRI

IRG

SRIC

Sweden

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Kenya

Civil society

SIPRI

Stockholm Process

Switzerland

Small Arms Survey

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

International Alert

Human Rights Watch

United States of America

Permanent Missions to the United Nations:

Ethiopia

Kenya

Norway

Somalia

Others

Monitoring Mechanism on Angola

Annex 3. List of main armed groupings in Somalia

Name	Location	Number of fighters	Alignment	Remarks
Security Forces of Somaliland	Northwestern Somalia	7000		
Al-Ittihad	Dispersed across Somalia	2000	TNG	Said to have divided into small cells that are dispersed in urban areas
Jama Ali Jama Militia	Puntland region	500		
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed Militia	Puntland region	1500	SRRC	
Mohammed Dhere Militia	South of Mogadishu	250		
Musa Sudi Yalahow Militia	Mogadishu	3000	SRRC	One of the strongest forces in Mogadishu
Hussein Mohamed Aideed Militia	Mogadishu	100	SRRC	
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah Militia	West of Mogadishu	700	TNG	One of the strongest forces in Mogadishu
Osman Ato Militia	Mogadishu	75		
Transitional National Government	Controls parts of Mogadishu and some surrounding areas	7000		Strength may be reduced by defections
Rahanweyne Resistance Army	Baidoa region	3000	SRRC	Led by Hassan Nur Shatigaduud
Somali National Front	Gedo region	300	SRRC	Alliance of Northern Marehan clan leaders
Juba Alliance	Town of Kismayo	800	TNG	Loose alliance of Southern Marehan leaders
Mohamed Said Hirsi Morgan	Mogadishu	400	SRRC	

Annex 4. List of alleged arms embargo violations

Date	Items	Alleged recipient	Alleged supplier
1993			
Oct.	Mortars and grenades	General Mohamed Farah Aideed	Iran
1994			
March	5000 assault rifles, 5000 handguns.	Somali police force.	United States
	Grenade launchers, machine pistols, pistols, revolvers, ammunition for these items		PHZ Cenrex, Poland; Arnex, Latvia
1997			
March	Ammunition	Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	
Mid-October	Light and heavy weapons	Hussein Mohamed Aideed	Libya
October 30 or 31	Ammunition for small arms, rocket propelled grenades, machine guns, anti-personnel landmines and grenades	Mohamed Said Hirsi Morgan and Ahmed Hashi Mohammed	Arrived from Ethiopia in a C-130 military transport aircraft.
1998			
August	Unspecified arms	Al Ittihad militia	Bangladesh and Kuwait
1999			
Feb. 18	3 ships carrying ammunition for light and heavy machine guns. Taken off in 13 trucks.	Hussein Mohamed Aideed.	Military transport ship allegedly chartered by Eritrea.
April 1	One truckload of ammunition.	Hussein Haji Bod militia.	Arrived from Ethiopia.
May	40 anti-aircraft guns, 4 armoured personnel carriers, 80 heavy machine guns, assault rifles, ammunition for aforementioned items	Hussein Mohamed Aideed, for onward shipment to Oromo Liberation Front.	Military transport ship allegedly chartered by Eritrea.
June 19	Assault rifles, heavy machine guns, ammunition for the aforementioned and explosives	Hussein Mohamed Aideed militia, allegedly for onward shipment to Oromo Liberation Front.	Military transport ship allegedly chartered by Eritrea.
2000			
January	Unspecified arms	Musa Sudi Yalahow	Arrived from Dubai via Djibouti

2001			
June 19	Assault rifles, machine guns, ammunition for said items, explosives	Hussein Mohamed Aideed	Eritrea, for onward shipment to Oromo Liberation Front.
2002			
March	Small arms ammunition	TNG militia	
April	12 mortars, several M30 artillery pieces, M30 artillery ammunition, mortar bombs, landmines and other unspecified ammunition	Unspecified militia opposed to the TNG	Ethiopia
April	Assault rifles, light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 4 106mm caliber anti-tank guns, ammunition for the aforementioned items.	Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	Ethiopia.
May	Anti-aircraft rockets, mortar bombs, light weapon ammunition	TNG militia	
June 7	Nine heavy trucks containing anti-aircraft guns, assault rifles and mortars of different calibers along with ammunition for the aforementioned items.	Mohamed Sudi Yalahow and Mohamed Dhere	Ethiopia.
June 10	Unspecified arms	Jama Ali Jama	Yemen and Djibouti

Annex 5. List of individuals

Name	Remarks
Jama Ali Jama	Leader of militia in self-proclaimed region of Puntland.
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	Leader of militia in self-proclaimed region of Puntland.
Shaati Quodudi	Militia leader in Southwest region
Hassan Nur Shatigaduud	Leader of RRA militia in southwest region of Somalia.
Omar Mohamed Mohamud "Finnish"	Leader of militia in Gedo region.
Mohammed Dhere	Self-proclaimed governor of Middle Shabelle district
Hussein Mohamed Aideed	Leader of militia in Mogadishu
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	Leader of militia in Mogadishu
Mohamed Said Hirsi Morgan	
Musa Sudi Yalahow	Leader of militia in Mogadishu
Osman Ato	Leader of militia in Mogadishu